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abstract
We investigate statistically the distribution of share price and the distributions
of three common financial indicators using data from approximately 8,000 com-
panies publicly listed worldwide for the period 2004-2013. We find that the
distribution of share price follows Zipf’s law; that is, it can be approximated by
a power law distribution with exponent equal to 1. An examination of the dis-
tributions of dividends per share, cash flow per share, and book value per share
- three financial indicators that can be assumed to influence corporate value
(i.e. share price) - shows that these distributions can also be approximated by
a power law distribution with power-law exponent equal to 1. We estimate a
panel regression model in which share price is the dependent variable and the
three financial indicators are explanatory variables. The two-way fixed effects
model that was selected as the best model has quite high power for explaining
the actual data. From these results, we can surmise that the reason why share
price follows Zipf’s law is that corporate value, i.e. company fundamentals,
follows Zipf’s law.
1 Introduction
Zipf’s law is an empirical law indicating a relationhip between the frequency
of an event and its rank. It is often formulated by using the complementary
cumulative distribution function following a power law, Pr(X > x) = cx−α
where Pr(X > x) denotes the probability that a stochastic variable, X , is
larger than x , c is a constant and is the power-law exponent. Zipf’s law states
that the power exponent, α , is equal to unity.
In his book, published in 1932 (Zipf 1932), G. K. Zipf reported that the
number of times that all the various words appear in human language closely
follows this law1 : Zipf’s law has since been found to apply in a variety of fields
; Zipf’s law for human language (Miller (1958)); Zipf’s law for monkey-typing
texts (Li (1992)), Zipf’s law for the number of people living in a city (Hill 1970,
Ijiri and Simon (1977), Gabaix 1999), Zipf’s law for the number of website visits
1Pareto(1897) before Zipf indicated that the distribution of individual incomes follows a
power law distribution.
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(Cunha, C.R., Bestavros, A., Crovella, M.E. (1995)). Zipf’s law for earthquakes
(Sornette, D., Knopoff, L., Kagan, Y.Y., Vanneste, C. (1996)), Zipf’s law for US
company sizes (Axtell (2001)), Zipf’s law for human transcriptomes (Ogasawara,
S. Kawamoto, and K. Okubo (2003)), Zipf’s law for gene expression (Furusawa
and K. Kaneko (2003)), and the others.
For several decades, a number of theoretical studies to explain power-law
laws and Zipf’s law have been presented by researchers working in various
academic fields. For example, Simon (1955), Mandelbrot (1961), Montroll
and Shlesinger (1982), Angle (2006), Zanette and Manrubia (1997), Marsili,
and Zhang (1998), Gabaix (1999), Reed (2000), Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti
(2010), and Irie and Tokita (2012), and others.
This paper investigates Zipf’s law for share prices and the reason why share
prices follow Zipf’s law. Although there are a number of empirical studies on
Zipf’s law, little attention has been given to examining Zipf’s law in terms of sta-
tistical significance testing. This paper takes on precisely this task. First, using
7,796 companies listed in world-wide stock markets, we demonstrate that share
prices follow Zipf’s law. Secondly, we introduce an empirical model proposed by
Kaizoji and Miyno (2016b) to estimate company fundamentals for these 7,796
companies. The empirical model is a panel regression model (a two-way fixed
effects model) that calculates company fundamentals by using dividends per
share, cash flow per share, and book value per share as explanatory variables.
Thirdly, we investigate whether the distribution of company fundamentals fol-
lows Zipf’s law. We find that each of the three financial indicators follows Zipf’s
law and that the distribution of fundamentals matches substantially the distri-
bution of share prices. On these grounds, we conclude that Zipf’s law for stock
price is caused by Zipf’s law for company fundamentals.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the
data set used; Section 3 demonstrates Zipf’s law for share prices; Section 4
introduces an empirical model proposed by Kaizoji and Miyano (2016b) to es-
timate company fundamentals; Section 5 establishes the applicability of Zipf’s
law for company fundamentals; Section 6 shows Zipf’s law for the three financial
indicators - dividends per share, cash flow per share, and book value per share -
that serve as the explanatory variables in the empirical model introduced in Sec-
tion 4; Section 7 proposes a stochastic model exploring Zipf’s law for company
fundamentals; Section 8 offers concluding remarks.
2 Data
The data used in this paper come from the OSIRIS database provided by Bu-
reau Van Dijk. The database contains financial information on globally listed
industrial companies. We use annual data for the period 2004-2013. After ex-
tracting financial data and stock data for 7,796 companies over a 10-year period,
we performed a statistical investigation of share price (at closing date) and three
financial indicators. The financial indicators - dividends per share, cash flow per
share, and book value per share - were obtained by dividing the values provided
in the database by the number of shares outstanding.
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3 Zipf’slaw for share price
Figure 1 shows the complementary cumulative distribution of share prices plot-
ted with logarithmic horizontal and vertical axes. Share prices in this distribu-
tion are pooled from the 7,796 companies included in the study for the period
2004-2013. In all, there are 47,161 total observations. The right tail of this
distribution is found to be approximately linear. That is, the distribution can
be approximated by a power law distribution, written as
Pr(X > x) = cx−α (1)
where c is a constant and α denotes the power-law exponent.
Figure 1: Zipf’s law for share price: The complementary cumulative dis-
tribution of share prices (log-log plot) based on 47,161 share price observations
pooled from 7,796 companies for the period 2004-2013. The power-law exponent,
estimated using the MLE (maximum likelihood estimator) method, is 1.003.
As a first step, we estimated the power-law exponent, Although several esti-
mators can be used to estimate the value of the power-law exponent, this paper
uses the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), which is commonly applied.
The maximum likelihood estimator of exponent α is 2
αˆ = n[
n∑
i=1
ln(
xi
xmin
)]−1 (2)
where, xi, i = 1, · · · , n are the observed values of such that xi ≥ xmin ,
and αˆ denotes the estimate of α. Using the share price data pooled from 7,796
companies for the period 2004-2013, the estimated power-law exponent is very
close to unity, αˆ = 1.003 . The results are presented in the first column of Table
1.
We then test whether that complementary cumulative distribution of share
prices follows a power law distribution by using a goodness-of-fit test based
on a measurement of distance between the empirical distribution function and
the fitted distribution function. The distance is commonly measured either by a
supremum norm or a quadratic norm. The most well-known supremum statistic
is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic written as
D = sup
x
|Fn(x)− F (x)| (3)
On the other hand, the Cramer-von Mises family statistic in a quadratic norm
is written as
Q = n
∫
∞
−∞
[Fn(x) − F (x)]
2ψ(x)dF (x) (4)
When ψ(x) = 1 , is the Cramer-von Mises statistic, denoted W 2 . Although
a number of other of goodness-of-fit statistics have been proposed, we use the
statistic of Cramer-von Mises in this study3. The null hypothesis that the
empirical distribution function is a power law distribution is rejected when a
small p-value is obtained. In our study, the null hypothesis is not rejected at the
2Details of the derivations are given in Appendix
3Clauset, et. al. (2009) found that Anderson and Darling statistics are highly conservative
in their application, reducing the ability to validate the power law model unless there are
many samples in the tail of distribution.
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10% significant level since we obtain a p-value of 0.132. That is, the Cramer-von
Mises test statistic indicates that the distribution of share prices follows a power
law.
In the second step, we verify that share price follows Zipf’s law using two
test procedures. One is the Lagrange Multiplier (LMZ) test proposed by Urzua
(2000); the other is the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. The Likelihood Ratio test
can be used in the case of large samples, while the Urzua test can be applied
to cases involving small samples4 . Test results are shown in Table 1. In both
tests, the null hypothesis that the power-law exponent is equal to 1 cannot be
rejected at the 10% significance level since the Chi-squared test statistics are
sufficiently small.
In summary, we can confirm that the distribution of share price follows Zipf’s
law in the right tail, which includes 2% of the total observations.
power-law Xmin Cramer-von Lagrange Likelihood Tail
exponent Mises test Multiplier Ratio
p-value LMZ LR n
1.003 133.4 0.132 0.013 0.010 943
Table 1: Test for Zipf’s law for share price: Estimation of the power-law expo-
nent of share price, and test results for the power law distribution and for Zipf’s
law. LMZ and LR test involve test-statistics of the Chi-squared distribution.
The null hypothesis that the power law exponent is equal to 1 cannot be rejected
at the 10% significance level.
4 Econometric model for share price(Kaizoji and
Miyano(2016b))
In the previous section, it was shown that Zipf’s law holds for share prices. This
section investigates the relationship between share price and company funda-
mentals. To that end, we use the panel regression model proposed by Kaizoji
and Miyano (2016b) to estimate company fundamentals. Since the database
used in this research contains cross-sectional data for the period 2004-2013,
panel analysis is appropriate. The model formulates the relationship between
share prices and three financial indicators - dividends per share, cash flow per
share, and book value per share - commonly used in models that evaluate cor-
porate valuation, so-called company fundamentals. The econometric model can
be formally written as
lnYit = a+ b1 lnX1,it+ b2 lnX2,it+ b3 lnX3,it+uit i = 1, · · · , N ; t = 1, · · · , T
(5)
where Yit denotes the dependent variable (share price) for company i in year
t ; a denotes a constant; X1,it is the dividends per share of company i in year t
; X2,it is the cash flow per share of company i in year t ; X3,it is the book value
per share of company i in year t ; uit denotes the error term.
4Urzua(2000) uses the table for significanct points for LMZ. The table is presented in the
Apendix.
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We estimate the model in equation (5) using the Panel Least Squares method.
In the panel regression model, the error term, uit , can be assumed to be divided
into a pure disturbance term and an error term due to other factors. Assuming
a two-way error component model with respect to error, the factors other than
disturbance are (i) factors due to unobservable individual effects, and (ii) factors
due to unobservable time effects. That is, the error term can be written as
uit = µi + γt + ǫit (6)
where µi denotes unobservable individual effects, γt denotes unobservable
time effects, and ǫit denotes pure disturbance.
If both µi and γt are equal to zero, equation (5) is estimated using the pooled
OLS method. If either µi or γt is equal to zero, equation (6) is a one-way error
component model. If both µi and γt are not equal to zero, equation (6) is a two-
way error component model. There are two estimation methods for estimating
the error term in equation (6). One is fixed effects estimation and the other
is random effects estimation. Therefore, the available estimation models are a
pooled OLS, an individual fixed effects model, a time effects model, a two-way
fixed effects model, an individual random effects model, a time random effects
model, and a two-way random effects model5 .
We estimated the models described above and found, after appropriate model
selection tests, that the two-way fixed effects model was the best model. The
model selection tests used in this study include the likelihood ratio test and F-
test for the selection of the pooled OLS model vs the fixed effects model, and the
Hausman test for the selection of the random effects model vs the fixed effects
model. The selection test for the pooled OLS model vs the random effects model
is based on the simple test proposed by Wooldridge (2010)6 The two-way fixed
effects mode is written as
lnYit = a+ b1 lnX1,it + b2 lnX2,it + b3 lnX3,it + ǫit (7)
a = a0 + µi + γt
where a0 is a constant term common to all companies, µi denotes the individual
fixed effects, and γt denotes the time fixed effects. µi is constant toward time
series and γt is constant toward cross section. ǫit is the pure disturbance. The
individual fixed effects, µi , account for an individual company’s heterogeneity
and includes such factors as the company’s diversity of corporate governance
and the quality of its employees. The time fixed effects,γt , indicate variables
that fluctuate over time but are fixed across companies. The time fixed effects
reflect various shocks, including financial shocks.
Table 2 shows the results of the Kaizoji and Miyano (2016b) panel regression
model described in equation (7). The signs of the three coefficients are all
positive, which is consistent with corporate value theory. The p-values for the
coefficients are quite small, indicating statistical significance in all three cases.
In addition, the R-squared value is 0.97, indicating that the estimated model
explains much of the variation in share prices.
5We used the EViews software package to estimate the models. The two-way random
effects model was unavailable since we used unbalanced panel data.
6Wooldridge (2010, p.299) proposed the method that uses residuals from pooled OLS to
check the existence of serial correlation.
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a0 b1 b2 b3 R2
Coefficient 1.485 0.137 0.298 0.378 0.969
Std. error 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.007
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 2: Results of the Panel Regression model (two-way fixed effects model)
provided by Kaizoji and Miyano (2016b). Total panel (unbalanced) observations
are 47,161. The p-values for the coefficients indicate statistical significance in
all cases. The R-squared value is 0.97.
The model (7) is found to have quite high explanatory power with respect to
share price, as the results shown above indicate. From a business management
point of view, companies can maximize their share price by enhancing dividends
per share, cash flow per share, and book value per share.
Estimates of the two-way fixed effects model for share price, ln Yˆit , can be
shown as
ln Yˆit = aˆ0 + µˆi + γˆt + bˆ1 lnX1,it + bˆ2 lnX2,it + bˆ3 lnX3,it (8)
We call Yˆit the theoretical share price.
5 Zipf’s law for company fundamentals
In the previous section, we found that the theoretical share price as estimated
using a two-way fixed effects model fits actual share price very well, indicating
that the two-way fixed effects model explains actual share price quite well.
However, this result does not explain the reason why the distribution of share
price follows Zipf’s law. This section examines company fundamentals, defined
as the optimal share price reflecting corporate value.
Kaizoji and Miyano (2016b) proposed computing company fundamentals
by eliminating the time fixed effects term, , from the theoretical share price
described in equation (8),
ln Y˜it = aˆ0 + µˆi + bˆ1 lnX1,it + bˆ2 lnX2,it + bˆ3 lnX3,it (9)
where Y˜it denotes the fundamentals of company i in year t .
Figure 2 shows the complementary cumulative distributions of actual share
price and company fundamentals plotted with logarithmic horizontal and ver-
tical axes. At a glance, Figure 2 suggests that the distribution of fundamentals
matches substantially the distribution of actual share prices. Indeed, the two-
sample Kolmogorov-Simirnov test leads us to accept the null hypothesis affirm-
ing the coincidence of actual share price and company fundamentals (K-statistic
= 0.007; p-value = 0.253). In short, the complementary cumulative distribution
of share price coincides with that of company fundamentals.
We next estimate the power-law exponents using the MLE (maximum like-
lihood estimator) method. Comparing the power-law exponent of company
fundamentals with that of actual share price and that of the theoretical share
price, we found that the three power-law exponents are all close to unity: 1.003
for the actual share price, 1.012 for the theoretical share price, 1.006 for the
fundamentals.
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We then use the Cramer-von-Mises test to determine whether the comple-
mentary cumulative distributions of share prices, theoretical share prices as
described in equation (8), and company fundamentals as described in equation
(9) are power law distributions. Large p-values in each of the tests indicate
that, for each of the three cases, the null hypothesis affirming that the comple-
mentary cumulative distribution is a power law distribution cannot be rejected.
(The p-values were 0.132 (actual share price), 0.106 (theoretical share price),
and 0.128 (company fundamentals).)
Finally, we investigate whether company fundamentals and theoretical share
price follow Zipf’s law. In both cases, both the Urzua (2000) test and the Like-
lihood Ratio test do not reject, at the 10% significance level, the null hypothesis
affirming that the distribution follows Zipf’s law (as was also true for actual
share price). In addition, we found that the complementary cumulative distri-
bution of the theoretical share price and that of company fundamentals follow
Zipf’s law in the right tail, which includes 2% of the total observations.
Table 3 summarizes the results of estimating power-law exponents and the
results of tests for power law and Zipf’s law for actual share prices, theoreti-
cal share prices, and company fundamentals. The data are pooled from 7,796
companies for the period 2004-2013; total observations are 47,161.
Share price power-law Xmin Cramer-von- Lagrange Likelihood Tail
exponents Mises test Multiplier Ratio
p-value LMZ LR n
actual 1.003 133.4 0.132 0.013 0.010 943
theoretical 1.012 128.5 0.106 0.187 0.136 943
fundamental 1.006 119.7 0.128 0.032 0.032 1,000
Table 3: Test for Zipf’s law for share price: LMZ and LR are test-statistics of
the Chi-squared distribution. The null hypothesis affirming that the power law
exponent is equal to 1 cannot be rejected at the 10 % significance level.
In summary, we can confirm that the distributions of share price and com-
pany fundamentals follow Zipf’s law in the right tail, which includes 2% of total
observations.
From the results described above, it is verified that the complementary cu-
mulative distribution of fundamentals obtained from equation (9) closely co-
incides with the complementary cumulative distribution of actual share price.
Therefore, we can infer that Zipf’s law for share price is caused by Zipf’s law
for company fundamentals.
Figure 2: The complementary cumulative distribution of actual share price
and company fundamentals (log-log plot). Black indicates actual share price, red
indicates company fundamentals. The complementary cumulative distribution
of fundamentals coincides statistically with that of actual share price.
6 Zipf’s law for financial indicators per share
In the previous section, we showed that the distribution of company fundamen-
tals, estimated using a two-way fixed effects model, coincides with the distri-
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bution of actual share price. This result suggests that company fundamentals
significantly affect actual share price. However, it does not explain the reason
why company fundamentals follows Zipf’s law. To consider the reason why Zipf’s
law for company fundamentals holds, we statistically investigate the distribu-
tions of the explanatory variables in the two-way fixed effects model described
in equation (7).
Figures 3 through 5 show the plots of the complementary cumulative dis-
tributions for the three per share financial indicators using pooled data for the
period 2004-2013. Figure 3 shows the distribution of dividends per share, Fig-
ure 4 shows the distribution of cash flow per share, and Figure 5 shows the
distribution of book value per share. It is obvious that the right tails of the
three distributions can be approximately linearized.
Following the same procedure that was used for share price and company
fundamentals, we estimated the power-law exponent for each of the three cases,
producing estimates of 1.015 for dividend per share, 1.051 for cash flow per share,
and 0.955 for book value per share. For all three distributions, Cramer-von-
Mises tests indicate that the null hypothesis affirming that these are power-law
distributions cannot be rejected (p-values are, 0.130, 0.151, and 0.221, respec-
tively). Moreover, results from applying Urzua’s test (LMZ) and the Likelihood
Ratio (LR) test indicate that, in all three cases, the null hypothesis affirming
power-law exponents cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level. Table 4
presents the results. In summary, all three financial indicators per share follow
Zipf’s law.
From the results described here, we can infer that the reason Zipf’s law
holds for company fundamentals is that the distributions of the three financial
indicators per share, representing corporate value, each follow the power law
distribution with a power-law exponent equal to 1. Thus, we can conclude that
the reason Zipf’s law holds for company fundamentals is that Zipf’s law holds
for dividends per share, cash flow per share, and book value per share.
Figure 3: Zipf’s law for dividends per share. The complementary cumulative
distribution of dividends per share (log-log plot) using 47,161 observations based
on pooled data from 7,796 companies for the period 2004-2013. The power-law
exponent estimated by the MLE (maximum likelihood estimator) method is
1.015.
Figure 4: Zipf’s law for cash flow per share. The complementary cumula-
tive distribution of cash flow per share (log-log plot) using 47,161 share price
observations based on pooled data from 7,796 companies for the period 2004-
2013. The power-law exponent estimated by the MLE (maximum likelihood
estimator) method is 1.051.
Figure 5: Zipf’s law for book value per share. The complementary cumula-
tive distribution of the book value per share (log-log plot) using 47,161 share
price observations based on pooled data from 7,796 companies for the period
2004-2013. The power-law exponent estimated by the MLE (maximum likeli-
hood estimator) method is 0.955.
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financial indicator power-law Xmin Cramer-von- Lagrange Likelihood Tail
per share exponents Mises test Multiplier Ratio
p-value LMZ LR n
Dividends 1.015 3.6 0.130 0.946 0.292 1250
Cash Flow 1.051 21.9 0.151 3.809 2.322 943
Book Value 0.955 98.9 0.221 2.828 2.010 943
Table 4: Tests for Zipf’s law for the three financial indicators. LMZ and LR
are test-statistics of the Chi-squared distribution. The null hypothesis affirm-
ing that the power-law exponent is equal to 1 cannot be rejected at the 10%
significance level.
7 A stochastic model of company fundamentals
In Section 3, we showed that our measure of company fundamentals follows
Zipf’s law. This means that there exists an extreme disparity in company fun-
damentals. In this section, we propose a model to explain the extreme disparity
in company fundamentals from a theoretical point of view. It is easy to imagine
that there are various factors explaining company fundamentals. For example,
the quality of company employees, the foresight of company executives, produc-
tion technology, and corporate governance can be listed as contributing factors.
The formation of corporate value has its origin in the compound multiplier ef-
fects of these factors. Thus, the disparity in company fundamentals can be
considered a reflection of differences in those factors, their number and influ-
ence, that affect corporate value. It can be assumed that there are a relatively
few companies that have an abundance of strongly positive factors, while a great
many companies have few such positive factors.
We propose a simple model which formalizes this notion7. Consider a
variable,Zn , which describes a factor that affects the fundamentals of a com-
pany.
If Zn is greater than 1, the factor represented will enhance company funda-
mentals. Inversely, if Zn < 1 , then the corresponding factor will have a negative
effect and reduce company fundamentals. We assume the following:
Assumption 1 (Compound multiplier effects): Zn represents a set
of stochastic variables that follow identical independent distributions. We can
assume that company fundamentals can be determined by multiplying the Zn
variables. That is, the value of company fundamentals is defined by the equation
XN = X0(Z0Z1Z2 · · ·ZN−1) = X0
N−1∏
n=0
Zn (10)
where X0 denotes the value of company fundamentals at the initial point.
Assumption 2: The number, N , of stochastic variables, Zn , differs by
company. Furthermore, we assume that N follows a geometric distribution.
That is,
fN(n) = Pr(N = n) = pq
n−1 for n = 1, 2, · · · (11)
7The model proposed here is mathematically the same as the model of income distributions
proposed by Reed (2004)
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where 0 < p < 1 , and q = 1−p. Thus, the value of company fundamentals,X¯ =
X0
∏N−1
n=0 Zn , is a variable, where N is a random variable following (10) .
Given Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, we have the following Proposition:
(i) If the probability that variable Zn is greater than one is non-negative,
that is, Pr(Zn > 1) > 0 , then the upper tail of the complementary cumulative
distribution of Xn can be approximated by the following power law distribution:
Pr(X¯ > 1) ∼ cx−α, as x→∞ (12)
where c and α are positive constants.
(ii) If λ = p
q
→ 0, then α→ 1 .
The proof is given by Reed (2004). For a sketch of the proof, see the Ap-
pendix.
As described above, if there are a few companies that have a large number
of factors positively affecting company fundamentals, then company fundamen-
tals follow Zipf’s law. Thus, to the degree that the stock market can properly
evaluate company fundamentals, company share price will follow the same dis-
tribution as company fundamentals.
8 Conclusion
This paper considers the reason why share prices follow Zipf’s law. To this
end, we investigate the relationship between company fundamentals and share
price. We use a database containing financial information for approximately
8,000 globally listed companies and estimate company fundamentals using a
panel regression model (two-way fixed effects model).
We find that the distribution of company fundamentals follows Zipf’s law,
and, moreover, that the distribution of fundamentals matches substantially the
distribution of actual share prices. From these findings, we conclude that Zipf’s
law for share prices reflects Zipf’s law for company fundamentals. More gen-
erally, to the extent that the stock market has the ability to properly evaluate
company fundamentals, the distribution of share price reflects company fun-
damentals. We also find that three common financial indicators - dividends
per share, cash flow per share, and book value per share - follow Zipf’s law.
These findings appear to suggest that Zipf’s law for company fundamentals has
a robust disposition.
We show a simple stochastic model to explain Zipf’s law for company fun-
damentals. However, the question of why the extreme intercompany disparities
described by Zipf’s law exist in a capitalistic economy remains mysterious and
unexplored.
Appendix
A: Table of significance values for LMZ for use in Urzua
(2000)
Source: Own Monte Carlo simulation using inversionmethod, and after 1000,000
replications
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n 10 15 20 25 30 50 100 200 ∞
Level
5% 6.19 6.14 6.09 6.08 6.03 5.98 5.98 5.99 5.99
10% 4.38 4.41 4.43 4.45 4.46 4.49 4.56 4.58 4.61
B: Derivations of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)
for the shape parameter of a power law.
In equation (1) , we described a power law distribution as a complementary
cumulative distribution with power-law form. The probability density function
for the Pareto distribution8 is defined as
f(x) =
αkα
xα+1
x ≥ k > 0 (B.1)
where α is the shape parameter and k is the scale parameter corresponding
to the minimum value of the distribution.
The probability density function, f(x) , is given by the following likelihood
function
L =
n∏
i=1
αkα
xα+1i
(B.2)
Logarithm L of the likelihood function is written as
lnL = ln
n∏
i=1
αkα
xα+1i
=
n∑
i=1
[lnα+ α ln k − (α+ 1) lnxi]
= n lnα+ nα ln k − (α+ 1)
n∑
i=1
lnxi (B.3)
Setting ∂L/∂α = 0 and solving for α , we obtain the following MLE for the
shape parameter.
n
α
+ n lnk −
n∑
i=1
lnxi = 0 (B.4)
α = n[
n∑
i=1
ln(
xi
k
)]−1 (B.5)
Let kˆ = mini xi , then
αˆ = n[
n∑
i=1
ln(
xi
xmin
)]−1 (B.6)
8The Pareto distribution is equivalent to a cumulative distribution with power law form
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C: Sketch of a Reed’s (2004) proof of the Proposition
We derive the Paretian tail behavior for the model. The derivation uses gener-
ating functions the probability generating function (pgf), which for a discrete
random variable X with pmf, is defined as
GX(s) = E(s
X) =
∑
fx(x)s
x (C.1)
and the moment generating function (mgf), which for any random variable X is
defined as
MX(s) = E(e
sX) (C.2)
provided the expectations exist. For a random variable, N, with a geometric
distribution (10), the pgf is
GN (s) =
ps
1− qs
(C.3)
Now let Y¯ = log(X¯) , where X¯ is a random variable denoting the funda-
mentals: (X¯ = X0
∏N−1
i=0 Zi) . Then
Y¯ = Y0 +
N−1∑
i=0
Ui (C.4)
where Y0 = log(X0) and Ui = log(Zi) for i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 . The mgf of Y¯
is
MY¯ (s) = E(e
sY¯ ) = E(exp[Y0s+
N−1∑
i=0
Uis]) (C.5)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random variables Y0, N
and U0, U1, · · · , UN−1 , assumed to be independent. Using conditional expecta-
tion, this can be written as
MY¯ =M0(s)E(exp[Y0s+
N−1∑
i=0
Uis]) (C.6)
whereM0(s) is the mgf of Y0 ;MU (s) is the common mgf of the Ui and the ex-
pectation is taken with respect to the random variable N . Now,E([MU (s)]
N ) =
GN (MU (s)), so that the mgf of X¯ can be written
MY¯ =M0(s)
pMU (s)
1 − qMU (s)
(C.7)
From standard results, the tail behavior of the pdf of Y¯ can be determined
from the singularities of its mgf. These occur at the solution (in s ) to MU (s) =
1/q . We examine these in the case where fundamentals are able to increase
and decrease: Pr(Zi > 1) > 0 and Pr(Zi < 1) > 0 so that Pr(Ui > 0) > 0
Pr(Ui < 0) > 0 .
MU (s) → ∞ as s → ∞and s → −∞. From this fact and the convexity
of MU (s), it follows that there are two simple poles of MY¯ (s), one positive α
and the other negative −β . This implies
fX¯(s) ∼ c1x
−α−1(as x→∞) and fX¯(s) ∼ c1x
β−1( as x→ 0) (C.8)
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The asymptotic behavior of the cdf FX¯(x) or the complementary cdf, 1 −
FX¯(x) , follows from integration.
We introduce the quantity λ = p/q and the quantity θ = 1− log(q) which are
related as θ = − log(1 + λ) , an increasing function. It follows that β increases
with λ . In the limit as λ → 0, β → 0 , the complementary cdf, 1 − FX¯(x)
, tends to follow the power law distribution with the exponent 1 + β equal to
unity in the right tail.
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Figure 1: Zipf’s law for share price: The complementary cumulative distribution
of the share prices. (log-log plot). The 47,161 share price data is pooled from
7,796 companies for the period 2004-2013. The power-law exponent estimated
by MLE (maximum likelihood estimator) method is 1.003.
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Figure 2: The complementary cumulative distribution of actual share price and
fundamental (log-log plot). black: actual share price and red: fundamentals The
complementary cumulative distribution of fundamentals coincides statistically
with that of actual share price
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Figure 3: Zipf’s law for the dividends per share. The complementary cumulative
distribution of the dividends per share (log-log plot). The 47,161 dividends per
share is pooled from 7,796 companies for the period 2004-2013. The power-law
exponent estimated by MLE method is 1.015
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Figure 4: Zipf’s law for cash flow per share. The complementary cumulative
distribution of the cash flow per share (log-log plot). The 47,161 cash flow per
share is pooled from 7,796 companies for the period 2004-2013. The power-law
exponent estimated by MLE method is 1.051
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Figure 5: Zipf’s law for cash flow per share. The complementary cumulative
distribution of the book value per share (log-log plot). The 47,161 book value
per share is pooled from 7,796 companies for the period 2004-2013. The power-
law exponent estimated by MLE method is 0.955
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